Hundred Flowers Campaign
1. Mao's motive for launching the Hundred Flowers Campaign was because he felt that he was in touch with the people and he thought it would be a good time to let people express their satisfaction and approval of Communist China. This shows that Mao wanted recognition and praise. Additionally he was trying to do everything he could to prove that Hu Feng's challenges of Marxist-Leninist values (who stated that Marxist-Leninist values were not the only criteria for judging artistic merit) were not true.
Great Leap industry
1. By the 'Great Leap Forward', Mao was referring to the second Five Year Plan of 1958-1962. His goal was to turn China into a modern industrial state, eventually to overtake the other major nations in production. The idea of a 'leap' forward is that China would become an industrial state in a short amount of time and not go through the steps toward getting there as slowly as the other great nations did.
2. Mao planned to achieve industrial 'lift-off' through the following; 1) The collectivized peasants, working in their communes, would produce a surplus of food. This food would be sold to other nations and the money would support the expansion of Chinese industry, and 2) The workers would create with their own hands a modern industrial economy which would be powerful enough to compete with the Soviet Union and the capitalist West.
3. With the second Five Year Plan, the term 'plan' was only somewhat accurate. Quotas and targets were set but these numbers did not have any economic value, that is, they did not have a realistic basis but were rather pulled out of the air randomly due to Mao's faith in Communist China's ability to produce. Since the provided figures were changed so frequently it can be said that there was only a vague plan to achieve some sort of quota or target but it wasn't really a plan because there was no set course of action that was supposed to take place.
4. The government's aim in introducing SOE's (state-owned enterprises) was to bring industry under total government direction. Existing firms and businesses could no longer be privately owned but now would work for the state. Prices, output targets, and wages were also to be fixed by the state - there was no negotiation. The purpose overall was for the government to have greater control over industry.
5. Mao did not achieve the Great Leap Forward because China lacked many essentials such as technical skills, managerial kn0w-how, efficiently run factories and plants, and an adequate transport system. Without these there was no chance of China becoming industrialized enough to overtake the rest of the world. Also, the output of industrial goods actually fell during this time period rather than achieving growth as hoped for.
6. Factors that prevented the Great Leap Forward from achieving its full targets were;
a) The quality of China's finished products fell a long way short of meeting its domestic industrial needs.
b) Political interference made the plan impossible to manage purely as an economic enterprise.
c) Officials issued demands and threats aplenty, but hardly any detailed instructions as to how things were actually to be done.
d) Despite the setting up of SOEs, so much was left to the local initiative that China really bever was operated as an integrated national plan.
e) As a result, quality control became difficult to manage and sustain,
f) In 1960 the USSR stopped providing financial assistance, and then China could not afford half of the 300 industrial plants that the Soviet Union had been sponsoring, including a number of steel mills.
7. The major limitations in Mao's economic thinking were the belief in applied Communism always being successful, as well as his unacceptance of the fact that his policies were at fault. Therefore, he would have been unable to make improvements if he did not even acknowledge that improvements could have been made. He didn't acknowledge failure as a result of Communist planning failing but he interpreted it as an intervention of the bourgeoisie and backsliders. His idea was to blame the messenger. It can be seen that his main limitation was that he blamed issues that he was responsible for, on outside factors that really were not relevant, thus no improvements could ever be made to any of his plans or goals.
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
Brezhnev Questions
BREZHNEV/CZECHOSLOVAKIA;
1. In 1968 Czechoslovakia was similar to Hungary in the following ways;
i. Both were brought on by policies carried out by incompetent, arrogant native leaders.
ii. Both sought to introduce a humane, progressive element into the Communist way of life.
iii. Both were repressed by the might of Soviet military while the rest of the world ceased to help.
iiii. Both were forced to accept Soviet-appointed satraps (Kadar in Hungary, Husak in Czechoslovakia.
2. The three commands that the Czechs made of Dubcek were;
i. The abolishment of the ‘central model of society’.
ii. Elimination of ‘administrative and undemocratic interference in all spheres of social and cultural life’
iii. The removal of Novotny as president of the republic.
3. The Soviets responded to the Czech judicial reform in that they became alarmed and they ordered extensive troop movement along Czechoslovakia’s eastern frontiers.
4. The alleged defenestration of Jan Masaryk became an issue again because in 1948, he died mysteriously and then this led to an interrogation and because the Czechoslovaks refused to participate in the inquisition, their Eastern European clients sent them a letter of unparalleled insult.
5. The Czech and Soviet perspectives on the ‘broad statement of principles’ differed. The Czechs considered their signature of the document as compliance and adherence to all Soviet demands, while the Soviets considered it carte blanche for intervention in Czechoslovakia to maintain their style of Socialism there.
6. The Czech response to the Soviet invasion was that they were stunned, because they for years entertained pan-Slav sentiments as well as pan-Soviet sentiments.
7. Two of Dubcek’s new policies were; censorship of press, and appointed pro-Soviet sympathizers to highr positions in the government.
8. The ultimate outcome of the invasion for Czechoslovakia was that it became the most oppressive Communist state of Eastern Europe, as Brezhev and his government became increasingly entangled wit Czechoslovak politics.
BREZHNEV/AFGHANISTAN;
1. What two justifications did the Soviets publicly offer for their Afghan invasion?
One was that Babrak had requested their military presence in Afghanistan to preserve his country for socialism, which was threatened by the United States and China. The other was that the threat to Afghanistan was also a threat to the USSR.
2. Other factors that may have motivated the USSR are that they had been friendly with Afghanistan and had made substantial financial investments in the country, as well as that the Soviets had signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship with the Taraki government, which had introduced many Soviet political, economical, social, and cultural institutions in the country.
3. The international reaction to Soviet policies in Afghanistan was condemnation of Soviet behavior and activity. Efforts to solve the problem (for example, efforts of the United Nations) were fruitless because of Soviet intransigence.
BREZHNEV/POLAND;
1. The six areas of conflict between the Soviets and the Poles were;
i. Religion - Poles are largely Catholic while Soviets are largely Russian Orthodox.
ii. "ideological deviation" - Poles withdrew from Soviet labor unions.
iii. Resistance to Soviet control of the Polish economy and exploitation of their resources.
iv. The security of the USSR and to its interests in central and eastern Europe.
v. It was a historic challenge.
vi. It was a protest against corruption of top Polish officials loyal to the USSR.
2. The six events that precipitated the '80-'81 Polish crisis;
i. The growing nationwide disillusionment with the government's policies.
ii. The government's failure to introduce desperately needed economic reforms that would improve the low living standard.
iii. The growing tension between religious and political leaders, which culminated the government's refusal to allow Pope John Paul VI to visit Poland in 1966 to commemorate the milennium of Polish Catholicism.
iv. The arrest and trial of several young party intellectuals who were critical of the official establishment and its policies.
v. The government's stoppage of a theatre production of a poetic drama (Dziady) because of its anti-Russian lines.
vi. The nationwide student unrest in March 1968 which was put down with excessive force.
3. Of the six areas of conflict, the most destructive one to Soviet-Polish relations definitely related to the Polish withdrawal from Soviet trade unions and the results of this. Steep price increases caused demonstrations, protests, and work stoppages. Poland came close to a working-class insurrection, and attempts to fix the economy were difficult as officials did not know how to handle them, and strikers' demands such as family allowances, early retirement, etc. and the appearance of an independent trade union alarmed the Soviets, and the defiance of the Polish to Soviet authority in these areas caused the Soviets to act again in 1980.
4. The least significant hindrance to the Polish-Soviet relations was their difference in religion. While the Pope's visit to Poland did put pressure on both sides, it did not yield destructive results and there were no outbreaks of anti-Polish or anti-Soviet sentiments. On the other hand the other five areas of conflict (historical reasons, economical reasons, Polish withdrawal from Soviet trade unions, etc.) seemed to have a more direct impact on events to come, while religious differences did somewhat hinder relations but were not one of the core reasons for worsening of Polish-Soviet relations.
1. In 1968 Czechoslovakia was similar to Hungary in the following ways;
i. Both were brought on by policies carried out by incompetent, arrogant native leaders.
ii. Both sought to introduce a humane, progressive element into the Communist way of life.
iii. Both were repressed by the might of Soviet military while the rest of the world ceased to help.
iiii. Both were forced to accept Soviet-appointed satraps (Kadar in Hungary, Husak in Czechoslovakia.
2. The three commands that the Czechs made of Dubcek were;
i. The abolishment of the ‘central model of society’.
ii. Elimination of ‘administrative and undemocratic interference in all spheres of social and cultural life’
iii. The removal of Novotny as president of the republic.
3. The Soviets responded to the Czech judicial reform in that they became alarmed and they ordered extensive troop movement along Czechoslovakia’s eastern frontiers.
4. The alleged defenestration of Jan Masaryk became an issue again because in 1948, he died mysteriously and then this led to an interrogation and because the Czechoslovaks refused to participate in the inquisition, their Eastern European clients sent them a letter of unparalleled insult.
5. The Czech and Soviet perspectives on the ‘broad statement of principles’ differed. The Czechs considered their signature of the document as compliance and adherence to all Soviet demands, while the Soviets considered it carte blanche for intervention in Czechoslovakia to maintain their style of Socialism there.
6. The Czech response to the Soviet invasion was that they were stunned, because they for years entertained pan-Slav sentiments as well as pan-Soviet sentiments.
7. Two of Dubcek’s new policies were; censorship of press, and appointed pro-Soviet sympathizers to highr positions in the government.
8. The ultimate outcome of the invasion for Czechoslovakia was that it became the most oppressive Communist state of Eastern Europe, as Brezhev and his government became increasingly entangled wit Czechoslovak politics.
BREZHNEV/AFGHANISTAN;
1. What two justifications did the Soviets publicly offer for their Afghan invasion?
One was that Babrak had requested their military presence in Afghanistan to preserve his country for socialism, which was threatened by the United States and China. The other was that the threat to Afghanistan was also a threat to the USSR.
2. Other factors that may have motivated the USSR are that they had been friendly with Afghanistan and had made substantial financial investments in the country, as well as that the Soviets had signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship with the Taraki government, which had introduced many Soviet political, economical, social, and cultural institutions in the country.
3. The international reaction to Soviet policies in Afghanistan was condemnation of Soviet behavior and activity. Efforts to solve the problem (for example, efforts of the United Nations) were fruitless because of Soviet intransigence.
BREZHNEV/POLAND;
1. The six areas of conflict between the Soviets and the Poles were;
i. Religion - Poles are largely Catholic while Soviets are largely Russian Orthodox.
ii. "ideological deviation" - Poles withdrew from Soviet labor unions.
iii. Resistance to Soviet control of the Polish economy and exploitation of their resources.
iv. The security of the USSR and to its interests in central and eastern Europe.
v. It was a historic challenge.
vi. It was a protest against corruption of top Polish officials loyal to the USSR.
2. The six events that precipitated the '80-'81 Polish crisis;
i. The growing nationwide disillusionment with the government's policies.
ii. The government's failure to introduce desperately needed economic reforms that would improve the low living standard.
iii. The growing tension between religious and political leaders, which culminated the government's refusal to allow Pope John Paul VI to visit Poland in 1966 to commemorate the milennium of Polish Catholicism.
iv. The arrest and trial of several young party intellectuals who were critical of the official establishment and its policies.
v. The government's stoppage of a theatre production of a poetic drama (Dziady) because of its anti-Russian lines.
vi. The nationwide student unrest in March 1968 which was put down with excessive force.
3. Of the six areas of conflict, the most destructive one to Soviet-Polish relations definitely related to the Polish withdrawal from Soviet trade unions and the results of this. Steep price increases caused demonstrations, protests, and work stoppages. Poland came close to a working-class insurrection, and attempts to fix the economy were difficult as officials did not know how to handle them, and strikers' demands such as family allowances, early retirement, etc. and the appearance of an independent trade union alarmed the Soviets, and the defiance of the Polish to Soviet authority in these areas caused the Soviets to act again in 1980.
4. The least significant hindrance to the Polish-Soviet relations was their difference in religion. While the Pope's visit to Poland did put pressure on both sides, it did not yield destructive results and there were no outbreaks of anti-Polish or anti-Soviet sentiments. On the other hand the other five areas of conflict (historical reasons, economical reasons, Polish withdrawal from Soviet trade unions, etc.) seemed to have a more direct impact on events to come, while religious differences did somewhat hinder relations but were not one of the core reasons for worsening of Polish-Soviet relations.
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